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absTraCT
This paper investigates the quality of financial reporting in Government Linked Companies (GLCs) and the effect of GLC’s 
transformation programme on the timeliness of accounting earnings in the Malaysian Market. This paper also compares 
the timeliness of earnings between the GLCs and Non-GLCs. This paper follows the model of Ball (2003) and estimates a 
linear pooled regression of accounting income on change in market value of equity during the period of 2004 to 2009. 
The method facilitates the determination of the timeliness of the accounting record to reflect economic gains or losses. 
The analysis shows that the quality of income in GLCs is higher than Non-GLCs. The results reveal that incremental 
economic losses sensitivity is more before the transformation programme compared to periods after the transformation 
programme and that economic gains recognition improves post year 2006 in GLCs. While there is an overall decline in 
the timeliness of losses recognition (in both GLC and Non-GLC groups), there is some improvement in the recognition of 
economic gains post year 2006. The results presented may be attributed to some transformation programmes implemented 
in GLCs and Non-GLCs. It is also acknowledged that the results could also be affected by the new IFRS implementation 
in year 2006. Yearly analysis reveals that there is no consistency in the effect of incremental economic losses sensitivity, 
which requires specific investigation into the incentives and specific forms of decisions in the future. While prior studies 
look at the timeliness of economic gains or losses recognition across countries, this paperattempts to investigate the 
issue of quality financial reporting in GLCs and how the implementation of the government transformation programme 
is able to have a significant impact on financial reporting in GLCs.
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INTrODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect 
of governance improvement in government linked 
companies on the quality of financial reporting following 
the government transformation programme. The quality 
of financial reporting, to a large extent, depends on how 
standards are implemented. ball, robin and wu (2003) 
studiedfour east asian countries – hong Kong, malaysia, 
singapore and Thailand. each of the four countries claimed 
that their financial statement presentation and disclosure 
is influenced by the International accounting standards 
(IAS), and the overall legal system is according to the 
common law regulation. This common law based standard 
is viewed as being of “high quality” and should result in 
more timely recognition of economic losses compared to 
countries adopting a code of law system. This is because the 
latitude provided by the principle based standards would 
enable the managers to make judgments in order to signal 
the underlying economic substance and value of the firm 
to uninformed financial statement users. 
 however, there is significant variation in the timeliness 
of both economic gains and losses recognition even within 
the four IAS and common law based countries. ball et al. 
(2003) conclude that the quality of financial statement 
depends on the domestic institutional environment of the 
country, culture, the appointment of manager, and the 
political involvement, which could influence the incentive 
of the preparer in presenting quality financial reports.This 
argument is consistent with sloan (2001), haniffa and 
Cooke (2003), and mohd saleh, Iskandar and rahmat 
(2007) who suggest that the quality of financial statements 
is related to good corporate governance and cultural 
values. 
 This study further investigates the quality of financial 
statements by focusing on the quality of financial reporting 
in Government Linked Companies (GLCs) incorporated in 
malaysia for the period of 2004 to 2009. This issue is of 
particular interest because, first, GLCs mostly consist of 
companies established from the government privatisation 
programmes. This sector contributes significantly to 
the overall economy of malaysia by controlling more 
than one-third of the market capitalisation of the capital 
market. second, the setting provides a unique opportunity 
to investigate the role of government investment in 
corporations and how it influences financial reporting. 
The results from this study can clearly demonstrate the 
effect of government involvement in companies that could 
influence the preparer’s incentive to signal information or 
to mislead users. a fresh insight into this issue is important, 
particularly in developing countries, due to the undeniable 
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quantum of government involvement in business. This 
research utilizes the timeliness of recognising economic 
gains and losses as the parameter to measure the quality of 
financial reporting. additionally, this study also contributes 
to the literature by examining the effect of whether the 
GLC transformation programme effectively enhances 
GLCs financial reporting performance and directs them to 
achieve their mission according to the policy fixed by the 
stakeholder. This research will also help the government 
to evaluate whether their existing approach in monitoring 
and controlling GLCs is effective and provides guidance for 
future improvement in formulating government policy. 
 This paper is organised as follows. The next 
section describes the characteristics of GLCs and the 
transformation. section 3 reviews the literature related 
to financial reporting incentives to develop the research 
hypotheses. section 4 presents the research method, which 
includes samples, measurement of research variables and 
model. section 5 deals with the results and discusses the 
research findings results and discussions. The last section 
concludes this study.
AN overvIew Of GLCs oPeraTION IN MaLaysIa
In terms of their ownership and controls, the model of 
GLCs in malaysia is quite similar to other state-owned 
enterprises in other countries such as egypt, bangladesh, 
Greece, France, Germany and the united kingdom 
(ahmed 2008; ezad & el-masry 2008). These GLCs 
are monitored closely by the government. because the 
government has a huge financial investment in these GLCs, 
the monitoring capabilities of the government in ensuring 
the competitiveness as well as performance of GLCs has 
been subjected to questions from various interested parties 
(ang & Ding 2006). 
 historically, there are many criticisms concerning the 
performance and management of GLCs, which resulted 
from the government’s bailout of bank bumiputera 
Malaysia Berhad (BBMB) during the 1980s. BBMB came 
to the public’s attention when the bank’s subsidiary in 
hong Kong was involved in a loan scandal and was 
helped by Petroleum Nasional berhad (a national oil and 
gas company), which injected billions of ringgit of fresh 
funds into the ailing bank (mohd saleh 2003). however, 
the second crisis in BBMB occurred in 1989. after new 
management took over BBMB and increased appropriate 
bad debt provisions, the bank’s operations reported a loss 
of RM1.06 billion. This time the government introduced a 
bail out package of fresh funds and a conversion of loan 
stocks held by Petroleum Nasional berhad into equity 
(friedlan 1989). similar bail out programmes involving 
Malaysian Airline Systems and Renong conglomerate 
happened during past economic crises, costing billions of 
government money. These companies were not classified 
as GLCs then. These firms were denote as GLCs since the 
government makes substantial capital investment in these 
companies.
 however, the issue of government assistance to firms 
is not new and not only confined to developing countries. 
In the United states, the government spent billions of 
dollars in subsidies, grants, reduced taxes and subsidised 
credit to help firms in their corporate restructuring. The 
justification of such an effort is the benefit to the public. 
These assistances were claimed to promote improved 
management practices, efficiency and productivity that 
will lead to increased economic growth and consumer 
satisfaction (Champlin & Knoedler 1999).
 In order to show that GLCs are always competitive 
and satisfy the concerns of various parties the Government 
issued a guideline for improving the performance of GLCs 
in march 2006. This guideline is known as “the guidelines 
for improvement transformation in GLC for development 
of malaysia to be a developed country”. The objective of 
these guidelines is to create sustainable improvement by 
exercising good corporate governance in GLCs. finally, 
good governance is expected to be translated into good 
financial health and strong performance in GLCs.
 ensuring the financial health of GLCs is important in 
an economy. In 2006, GLCs contributed 36% or RM260 
billion of the total capital market of the Kuala Lumpur 
stock exchange (KLse) (now known as bursa malaysia). In 
the market, with a total market capitalisation of more than 
RM1 billion in march 2010, the employees Provident fund 
(ePf) presently dominates the daily trades (up to 50%) in 
the equity and bond markets of bursa volume. Therefore, 
the importance of investigating GLC companies with 
respect to their reporting quality and how the government 
transformation programme has impacted the reporting 
quality is undeniable. It is hoped that the high reporting 
quality would assist governance mechanisms in monitoring 
the company management and, in the end, contribute to 
the long term sustainability of the GLCs performance.
CharaCTerIsTICs Of GOverNmeNT LINKeD 
COmPaNIes
DefINITION aND CaTeGOry
state owned and controlled companies (now termed as 
GLCs) are one of the project initiatives under the New 
economic Policy.1 The establishment of GLCs was derived 
from the initiative to restructure and redistribute economic 
income to the bumiputera2 and non-bumiputera following 
a racial riot on 13th may1969. 
1 The New economic Policy or Dasar ekonomi baru (Deb) is a socioeconomic programme in malaysia which was introduced in 1971 by the 
prime minister (then) Tun abdul razak Dato’ hussein. The main objective is to achieve national integration and unity. 
2 bumiputera or bumiputra is a malay term widely used in malaysia, embracing indigenous people of the malay archipelago.
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 according to the Circular of Putrajaya Committee on 
GLC high Performance or PCG3 (2006), GLCs are defined as 
companies that have commercial objectives but under the 
direct interest or control of the Government of malaysia. 
This interest refers to the power and capabilities (normally 
according to the percentage of shareholding) in appointing 
members of the board, senior management, and decision 
making for GLCs (i.e. in contracts, strategy, restructuring, 
financing, procurement, investment etc.). They are owned 
either directly by the government (through the ministry of 
finance Incorporated) or through the Government Linked 
Investment Company (GLIC).
 The GLIC is defined as the investment company 
related to the federal Government that allocates partly 
or fully their capital for investment in GLCs. These GLICs 
accumulate funds from the public in the form of mandatory 
contributions or voluntary investment, which is fully 
guaranteed by the government. This company is under 
the influence of the federal government in appointing the 
board and senior management and in setting the period 
for individual reporting to the government. examples 
of GLICs include Kumpulan wang simpanan Pekerja 
(employees Provident fund), Khazanah Nasional berhad 
(an investment holding company of the Government of 
malaysia), Kumpulan wang amanah Pencen (retirement 
fund Incorporated), Lembaga Tabung angkatan Tentera 
(Armed Forces Fund Board – an agency under the Ministry 
of Defence), Lembaga Urusan Tabung haji (malaysian 
hajj Pilgrims fund board), Kementerian Kewangan 
Diperbadankan (ministry of finance Incorporated) and 
Permodalan Nasional berhad (Government of malaysia 
2006b).
 from the total number of GLCs, 15 companies are held 
by the constituent GLIC. These GLCs are known as Group 15 
(G-15) and have in average of 65% of the capital market. 
The 15 GLCs are maybank, Telekom malaysia berhad, 
Tenaga Nasional berhad, sime Darby berhad, bumiputra-
Commerce holdings berhad (Previously Commerce 
asset holdings berhad), Golden hope Plantation berhad, 
malaysian airline system, Proton holdings berhad, 
Kumpulan Guthrie berhad, affin holdings berhad, Uem 
world berhad, boustead holdings berhad, BIMB holdings 
berhad, malaysian resources Corporation berhad and 
malaysia building society berhad. Other GLCs are either 
controlled by the ministry of finance Incorporated, state-
Owned Companies or Khazanah malaysia4  (Government 
of malaysia, 2006b). 
 GLCs are controlled by the malaysian Government. 
Thus, political pressure could have a significant influence 
on the preparation of the financial report. The majority 
of the Board of directors (Bod) of GLCs are bumiputera 
(haniffa & Cooke 2002). They can have cross directorships 
of up to a maximum of five companies (haniffa & Cooke 
2002). according to haniffa and Cooke (2002), malay 
leadership is characterised by high power distance, 
low masculinity, high uncertainty avoidance and low 
individualism. Thus, based on the malay culture, the 
tendency of the directors is to adopt high secrecy values 
and, thus, lead to low disclosure of information (Gray 
1988; haniffa & Cooke 2002). 
GLCs TraNsfOrmaTION PrOGramme
The guideline for “the transformation of GLCs for the 
development of malaysia to be a developed country” 
was first circulated in march 2006. The objective of 
this guideline is to create sustainable improvement 
environment by implementing good corporate governance 
practices in GLCs. This circular explains the pathway for 
GLCs transformation according to phases. Phase 1 covers 
the period for GLCs to mobilise resources, diagnose 
problems and plan for transformation, which covers14 
months. Phase 2 discusses the method for GLCs to generate 
the momentum for transformation. This phase covers a 
period between 12 to 17 months after the transformation 
manual was published at the end of July 2005. In phase 
3, tangible results and sustained benefits across all GLCs 
are expected to emerge. finally, in phase 4 several GLCs 
would be expected to become regional champions while 
others are performing at par with their competitors. a 
detailed explanation of the long term GLC transformation 
programme is shown in figure 1.
 The GLC transformation long term programme 
circular is expected to have a significant impact on the 
quality of financial reporting. One of the characteristics 
of good corporate governance is dealing with succession 
planning and strategic business planning. In the GLC 
scenario, this characteristic is elaborated in depth in the 
“Green book”, which is related to guidelines for board 
mechanisms to enhance the efficiency of the company. The 
Green book suggests that directors of GLCs are expected 
to implement an actionable improvement programme 
by December 2006. This means that the effectiveness 
of the board in generating positive results could be seen 
for the periods after 2006 (Government of malaysia, 
2006a), depending on how fast the improvements can be 
translated into results. Thus, this study assumes that GLCs 
that adopted this circular would experience an increase 
in the management effectiveness after the circular was 
issued. This management effectiveness includes issuing 
quality financial reporting,i.e. in terms of the timeliness 
in recognising gains or losses.
3 PCG is chaired by the second finance minister, with participation from the heads of the Government-Linked Investment Companies. 
4 Khazanah Nasional was incorporated on 3 september 1993 as a public limited company and governed by the malaysian Companies act of 
1965.
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LITeraTUre revIew
The QUaLITy Of fINaNCIaL rePOrTING 
There are many factors influencing the quality of reporting 
across the world (basu 1997 – U.s.; Ding and stolowy 
2006 – france; ahmed 2008 – bangladesh; ezad and el-
masry 2008 – egypt). ball et al. (2003) listed six factors 
that influence the incentives of the preparer (i.e. managers 
and auditors) in financial reporting: 1) the system for 
determining and enforcing accounting standards; 2) the 
influence of family control, guanxi (personalised network) 
and banks on the demand for public disclosure; 3) political 
influence on financial reporting practice; 4) the link 
between tax and financial reporting; 5) the enforcement 
mechanisms; and 6) the standards.These incentives 
influence accountants in their judgment on the recognition 
and disclosure of certain items and, hence, shape financial 
reporting in a particular country.
 according to ball et al. (2003), the characteristics of 
east asian financial reporting (including malaysia) show 
a resemblance to countries predominantly governed by 
the code law model. In the code law model, the preparers’ 
incentives are mostly influenced by their government’s 
policies and decision making. In addition, most of their 
companies are managed by family related directors 
and there is a direct link between the tax and financial 
reporting. On average, these countries also experience 
a low level of enforcement mechanisms, which has 
caused the preparers’ incentive to dominate the financial 
reporting practices (saudagaran & Diga 2000). In the 
case of Malaysia, Ball et al. (2003) found that financial 
reporting in malaysia is less conservativeand exhibits 
no greater timeliness in recognising economic losses 
relative to gains. These characters are similar to countries 
under the code law model. The analysis also shows that 
the timeliness of recognising loss recognition is lower 
compared to gain recognition. These results explain (at 
least partly) why malaysia has generally lower levels of 
public disclosure and liquidity than other common law 
countries. This study attempts to relate these issues with 
the involvement of government in the malaysian business 
landscape. while there is a spectrum of ways to describe 
the quality of financial reporting, such as the quality of 
earnings, accruals, valuation of assets and disclosure, this 
study makes an attempt to shed some light on the issue of 
gains or loss recognition timeliness, which has received 
very little attention in prior studies. 
The TImeLINess Of eCONOmIC INCOme 
aND LOss rePOrTING
Timeliness is defined as the extent to which current-period 
accounting income incorporates current-period economic 
fIGUre 1. Phases in GLC Transformation Programme
(Source: Government of Malaysia (2006a))
Phase Phase 1:
mobilisation, Diagnosis & 
Planning
Phase 2:
Generating Momentum
Phase3:
Tangible results
Phase 4:
full National benefits
Period 14 months 
(May 2004 - July 2005)
12 - 17 months
(august 2005 - December 2006) 2 - 5 years
5 - 10  years 
Onwards
Occasion Measures PCG formed:
• KPI-PLCs
• Performance contracts
• revamp of Khazanah
• GLC leadership changes
Transformation Manual 
launched (July 2005)
• Policy guidelines
• Ten 2005/2006 initatives
Targeted 
Outcomes
• 2005/2006 Initiatives 
implemented
• full roll-out in place 
• Key policies endorsed and 
executed upon
• early fruits of sustainable 
improvements
• Tangible and 
sustainable benefits 
across all GLCs
• visible benefits to 
all stakeholders. e.g 
- customer, vendors, 
employees, etc
• Large scale strategic 
and financial changes 
made
• material changes to 
Boards
• several regional 
champions
• most GLCs performing 
at par with competitors



 2005 2006 2007 2010 2015
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income (Ball et al. 2003). while conservatism is interpreted 
as the extent to which current-period accounting income 
asymmetrically incorporates economic losses, relative to 
economic gains (basu 1997). Thus, conservatism may 
result in achieving timeliness in reporting economic losses 
but not gains. Consistent with this, Ding and stoloway 
(2006) found that in french companies, good news has 
a delayed impact on earnings. The results suggest that 
accountants only allow the effect of good news to gradually 
affect the earnings measure over some time. Conversely, 
bad news is reflected rapidly in the earnings.
 basu (1997), and Giner and rees (2001) explored 
asymmetric timeliness in the reporting of good and bad 
news. Differences in the association between current period 
earnings and both current and prior periodreturns might 
exist because of differences in the speed of recognition 
of bad versus good news. moreover, basu (1997) argued 
that the long process of recognition of good news drives 
persistence in earnings series in contrast to the conservative 
reporting of bad news.
 The study by eriotis et al. (2009), on the effect of 
asymmetric timeliness in the reporting of good and bad 
news on the properties of profitabilityin the athens stock 
exchange, also suggests that there are differencesbetween 
the speed of recognition of good and bad news. ezat and 
el-masry (2008) found a significant relationship between 
the timeliness of Corporate Internet reporting and firm 
size, type of industry, liquidity, ownership structure, board 
composition and board size. however thus far, there is 
no formal test on the timeliness of reporting good and 
bad news in GLCs as the greater government influence 
in the corporate governance mechanisms would create 
different incentives and affect the timeliness of income. 
as the emphasis of the government covers financial and 
non financial parameters, the managers may have lower 
incentive to manage reported earnings so long as the 
managers can use social contributions that the companies 
have made to justify the position of the companies.
 In the context of GLCs, Ang and ding (2006) studied 
the governance structure of GLCs in singapore, focussing 
on ownership or the control structure. They found that 
singaporean GLCs have higher valuation and better 
corporate governance than Non-GLCs. similar to other 
research, as indicated earlier, ang and Ding’s (2006) 
study also used cross sectional GLCs data to examine the 
effect of governance on the valuation of GLCs. To date, 
it is unclear how the overall transformation of the GLCs 
programme affects the quality of information provided 
to the users. we expect that before the transformation 
programme there was a lack of appropriate monitoring 
mechanisms in place with respect to monitoring the 
financial health of the company. If appropriate governance 
mechanisms are in place, the risk of failure could be 
avoided since the risk management function of the board 
could detect any initial problems in the company and 
measures to address the problems could be taken earlier. 
similarly, if appropriate measurement of income and 
disclosures are made, investors and analysts with the 
necessary skills could detect the problems that exist in 
the company before actual failure occurs. Overall, given 
the background of GLCs in malaysia, we expect that the 
timeliness of accounting gains and losses was lower 
(higher) in GLCs compared to Non-GLCs before (after) 
the government transformation programme. 
ResearCh MeThODOLOGy
The overall sample comprises 4,234 company-year 
observations. These are listed companies on bursa malaysia 
(previously known as Kuala Lumpur stock exchange)
between 2004 and 2009. according to a Government 
gazette related to GLCs, released on 29th January 2004, there 
were 57 GLCs (whereby 39 companies are listed companies 
and 18 are GLC subsidiary companies). 
 all data (which are all financial data, as listed 
in equation 1) are gathered and pooled from the 
Datastream database. since the transformation manual 
was published in July 2005, we use this as a cut-off point 
for the government transformation programme to be 
effective. for analysis comparison of the transformation 
programme, we denote the period 2004 to 2005, as before 
the transformation programme, and 2007 to 2009, as after 
the transformation programme. It is also acknowledged 
that the effect of the transformation programme could be 
seen a few years after the issuance of the circular. year 
2006 is eliminated to account for the transformation 
transition period.
 from 4,234 company-years for the period of 2004 
to 2009, we trimmed the top and bottom 1% of sorted 
observations according to each variable to deal with 
outliers. finally, 4,074 company-years data qualify for 
further analysis. Of this, only 139 company-years are 
related to GLCs in the sample period. Table 1 shows the 
breakdown of the sample according to years and industry. 
It appears from the table that there is no systematic 
distribution pattern across years and industry, and all 
industries are fairly represented. This is because we take 
the data of all of the companies listed on bursa malaysia 
and make categories of GLC and Non-GLC observations. 
The Non-GLCs are used as comparisons.
 according to ball et al. (2003), the yearly changes 
in market value of equity (adjusted for current period 
dividends and capital transactions with shareholders) is 
used to proxy for economic income. accounting income 
is measured by yearly change in book value of equity 
(adjusted for dividends and capital transactions with 
shareholders) assuming “clean surplus” accounting. for 
each year, we estimate a linear regression of accounting 
income on change in market value of equity as suggested 
by basu (1997) and ball et al. (2003) for:
1. Overall 2004 to 2009 companies financial report;
2. GLC and Non-GLC companies financial report during 
that period; and
3. before (year 2004-2005) and after (year 2006-2007) 
circular issued for GLC and Non-GLC companies 
financial report.
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 we adopted the methodologyof ball et al. (2003) to 
investigate the issue. The equation for regression is as 
follows:
 NIit=βoj+β1jRit+β2jRdit+β3jRitRdit+εi (1)
whereby:
1. The earnings variable NIt is NPbTt/NiPt-1, where NPbT 
is net profit before tax, N is the number of shares and 
P is share price, for period t. 
2. stock return rt is the change in market share price 
scaled by prior period share price (P t-Pt-1)/Pt-1, 
including dividends over the company’s fiscal year. 
This represents the economic income.
3. an observation with negative return is given a value 
of 1 (and 0 otherwise), which is denoted by a dummy 
variable, rDit.
 The equation is used to run using pooled cross 
section (across firms) and time-series (fiscal years) 
data. The sensitivity of accounting income to positive 
changes in market values of equity is represented by β
1j
. 
This coefficient is our proxy for economic gains. The 
incremental sensitivity of accounting income to negative 
changes in market values of equity is measured by β
3j
. This 
coefficient will represent the proxy for economic losses. 
The total sensitivity of income to decreases in market value 
is (β
1j 
+ β
3j
) (ball et al. 2003).
ResULTs aND dIsCUssION
Overall, from Table 2, we can see that GLCs are more 
volatile than Non-GLCs in return and accounting income. 
The table shows that the data for both categories of 
company(GLCs and non-GLCs) are generally skewed (mean 
> median). This gives an indication that the data may not be 
normally distributed, which may lead to non-normality in 
the residuals from the regression. To get an unbiased result 
we include a test for non-normality of the residuals. It also 
appears from the table that the mean and median for the 
returns reported here are different from those previously 
reported in ball et al. (2003). This is because ball et al. 
(2003) usedthe mean adjusted returns to control for the 
influence of exogenous macroeconomic factors on returns. 
In this study, the use of a single country data eliminated 
such an effect.
 Table 2 also indicates that there are some variations 
in the means and medians of returns and net income 
across years. These variations demand additional analysis 
to be done to examine whether other factors such as 
economic wide effect may have affected our results. 
a non-parametric test using the mann whitney U test 
(Non-parametric test is used in light of the non-normal 
distribution discussed earlier) shows that the overall 
medians of Return and NI are significantly larger in 
GLCs compared to Non-GLCs (Z=2.219, p =0.026). This 
test suggests that the basic component and perhaps the 
behaviour of these two proxies could be different in these 
two categories of companies.
 Table 3 explains the contemporaneous association 
between earnings and returns.we have investigated the 
residuals and the plots suggest that the distribution of 
residuals is satisfactorily normal. The results reveal that 
adjusted r2 improves as outliers were deleted from the 
data (from 2.8% to 6.9%). These values of adjusted r2 
are comparable to ball et al. (2003) who found that the 
adjusted r2 value for malaysia is around 9%. results 
of the analysis presented in the table also show that the 
adjusted r2s (i.e. variance explained) are in general, higher 
in GLCs than Non-GLCs for both pre (2004-2005) and post 
(2007-2009) transformation programme. This implies that, 
in general, the earnings timeliness is higher in GLCs than 
in Non-GLCs. The result suggests that the timeliness of 
earnings in GLCs was better than Non-GLCs even before 
the transformation programme. It also appears that from 
the perspective of earnings timeliness, the transformation 
programme has not played a significant role. In contrast 
to our expectation, the variance explained is higher before 
compared with after the transformation programme. 
however, the reduction of adjusted r2 is also experienced 
TabLe 1. sample Distribution across Industry and year 
Panel a
year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Non GLC 618 673 732 761 800 351 3,935
GLC 23 24 25 25 28 14 139
Total 641 697 757 786 828 365 4,074
         
Panel b
Industry Service Plantation Consumer 
Product
Industrial 
Product
real estate / 
Construction
Financial 
Institution
other Total
Non GLC 738 402 986 1014 637 78 80 3,935
GLC 49 8 21 20 13 22 6 139
Total 787 410 1007 1034 650 100 86 4,074
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TabLe 2. sample Characteristics: Descriptive statistics
year
Non-GLC GLC Total
Return NI Return NI Return NI
2004 N
Mean
Median
std. Deviation
618
0.078
0.005
0.467
618
0.037
0.056
0.165
23
0.121
0.076
0.285
23
0.054
0.080
0.173
641
0.079
0.006
0.461
641
0.038
0.057
0.165
2005 N
Mean
Median
std. Deviation
673
-0.219
-0.243
0.312
673
0.022
0.055
0.198
24
-0.082
-0.071
0.221
24
0.015
0.076
0.180
697
-0.214
-0.235
0.310
697
0.022
0.056
0.197
2006 N
Mean
Median
std. Deviation
732
0.133
0.040
0.445
732
0.024
0.074
0.238
25
0.243
0.119
0.413
25
0.017
0.087
0.308
757
0.137
0.047
0.444
757
0.024
0.075
0.240
2007 N
Mean
Median
std. Deviation
751
0.240
0.114
0.538
761
0.057
0.080
0.221
25
0.388
0.167
0.599
25
0.129
0.107
0.138
786
0.245
0.121
0.541
786
0.059
0.080
0.219
2008 N
Mean
Median
std. Deviation
800
-0.277
-0.311
0.321
800
0.020
0.057
0.25
28
-0.315
-0.368
0.262
28
0.056
0.062
0.134
828
-0.278
-0.313
0.139
828
0.031
0.075
0.265
2009 N
Mean
Median
std. Deviation
351
0.139
0.033
0.486
351
0.028
0.074
0.269
14
0.293
0.173
0.463
14
0.109
0.098
0.080
365
0.145
0.036
0.485
365
0.031
0.075
0.265
Total N
Mean
Median
std. Deviation
3,935
0.002
-0.077
0.476
3,935
0.032
0.063
0.215
139
0.085
0.060
0.458
139
0.060
0.080
0.190
4,074
0.005
-0.074
0.475
4,074
0.033
0.064
0.214
             
Note: NIt is Xt/NiPt-1, where X is net income before extraordinary items, N is adjusted number of shares and P is share price. stock return rt is the change in share price, 
scaled by prior period share price. Negative return is denoted by a dummy variable, rD
it.
TabLe 3. Contemporaneous association between earnings and returns
overall 
(1)
Trimmed 1% 
outlier (2)
GLC only 
(3)
GLC 
(2004 & 2005) 
(4)
GLC
(2007 - 2009) 
(5)
Non GLC 
(2004-2005) 
(6)
Non GLC 
(2007-2009) 
(7)
β
oj
0.032*** 
(3.405)
0.032***
(9.940)
0.091***
(3.541)
0.074***
(1.956)
0.090***
(3.355)
0.058***
(5.321)
0.058***
(5.409)
β
1j
0.016***
(11.175)
0.119***
(17.432)
0.064
(1.364)
0.188
(1.398)
0.089**
(2.299)
0.076***
(3.806)
0.085***
(5.229)
β
2j
-0.022
(-0.474)
0.012
(0.196)
0.025
(0.540)
0.031**
(2.017)
-0.002
(-0.153)
β
3j
0.238*
(1.862)
0.528**
(2.177)
0.093
(0.881)
0.220***
(5.885)
0.110***
(3.048)
adj r2 0.028 0.069 0.139 0.393 0.154 0.114 0.081
f stat. 124.885*** 303.866*** 8.440*** 10.929*** 4.999*** 56.516*** 56.776***
N 4,234 4,074 139 47 67 1,291 1,912
NIit=βoj+β1jRit+β2jRdit+β3jRitRdit+εit ……………………………equation (1)
Note: NIt is Xt/NiPt-1, where X is net income before extraordinary items, N is adjusted number of shares and P is share price. stock return rt is the change in share price, 
scaled by prior period share price. Negative return is denoted by a dummy variable, rD
it.
. figures in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, *** denotes significant at 0.10, 0.05, 
0.01 levels, respectively.
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by the Non-GLCs (pre 2006 is 0.114 while post 2006 is 
0.081). It should be noted that these Non-GLCs do not have 
a formal transformation programme as in the GLCs (though 
these Non-GLCs may have their own transformation 
programme individually applied during the observation 
years). This suggests that the reduction in adjusted r2 
could also be attributed to economic and market wide 
effects such as the implementation of new IFRSs, which 
came into effect in 2006. The analysis also shows that 
companies recognized their losses in a timely manner for 
both the 2006 to 2007 and 2004 to 2005 periods. 
 however, when we look into the specific coefficient of 
β
1j
 and β
3j,
which determine different timeliness levels for 
recognizing gains and losses, a different story emerges. both 
coefficients are significant for Non-GLCs indicating that the 
companies are timely in recognizing economic gains and 
losses although the strengths are at different levels. however, 
for the GLCs, the coefficient β
3j 
value equals 0.238, whichis 
mildly significant before the transformation programme 
(t=1.862), but not significant after the transformation 
programme. This indicates that the incremental economic 
losses sensitivity is more before the transformation 
programme compared to periods after the transformation 
programme in GLCs. Conversely, the coefficient β
1j
, which 
is not significant before the transformation programme 
(coefficient=0.188, t-statistic=1.398), becomes significant 
after the transformation programme (coefficient=0.089, 
t-statistic=2.299). This result implies that economic 
gains recognition improves post year 2006. however, 
when we take a closer look at the results in Non-GLCs a 
fIGUre 3. r square and Coefficients Trend (Non-GLC)
fIGUre 2. r square and Coefficients Trend (GLC) 
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similar pattern occurs. The coefficient value, as well as 
the t-statistics, improves after year 2006. These results 
may also imply that the improvement of economic gains 
recognition may be partly due to the implementation of 
the new IFRS standards in malaysia. The use of more fair 
values in financial statements may improve economic gains 
recognition. 
 we also plot the sensitivity of accounting income to 
positive returns (β
1j
) and negative returns (β
1j
 + β
3j
). from 
the graph, it appears that there is significant volatility with 
respect to β
3j
 values across years for both groups that are 
translated into variations in β
1j
+ β
3j 
values. This shows the 
incremental economic losses sensitivity is not stable and 
subject to significant managerial discretion. Investigation 
into the incentives and specific forms of decisions related 
to economic losses recognition is subject to future research. 
As a limitation of the study, investigation of the actual 
improvement in GLCs governance post transformation era 
was not made in this study.
CONCLUsION
Overall, this study further investigates the quality of 
financial statements by focusing on the quality of financial 
reporting in Government Linked Companies (GLCs) 
incorporated in malaysia for the period of 2004 to 2009. 
we also look at the trend and pattern of the quality of 
financial reporting in pre (2004 to 2005) and post (2007 to 
2009) transformation programme. since the transformation 
programme aims to improve governance in GLCs, any 
improved reporting practices can be indirectly linked to 
improved governance in GLCs.
 The results suggest that earnings timeliness is 
higher in GLCs than in Non-GLCs and the timeliness of 
earnings in GLCs is better than Non-GLCs, even before 
the transformation programme. On the effect of the 
transformation programme on GLCs, we found that 
incremental economic losses sensitivity is more before the 
transformation programme compared to periods after the 
transformation programme. we also found that economic 
gains recognition improves post year 2006. Taking a 
closer look at this issue, it appears that there is an overall 
decline in the level of earnings timeliness (in both GLC and 
Non-GLC groups), which could be attributed tothe effect 
of the new IFRS implementation drive in malaysia. yearly 
analysis reveals that there is non-stability in the effect of 
incremental economic losses sensitivity, which requires 
specific investigation into the incentives and specific forms 
of decision in the future.
 It appears that the government transformation 
programme does not have a significant effect on the quality 
of reporting in GLCs. a guideline in strengthening financial 
management and reporting to achieve quality reporting 
in GLCs is needed. This is very important for the good 
functioning of the capital market because GLCs contribute 
about one-third of the total market capitalisation.
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